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Complementarity: A Global View of Brain Organization 
In order to discuss the role of filling-in in the brain, it is helpful to caste this issue within a 
larger framework that clarifies more global properties of brain organization. This is useful 
because, I would contend, filling-in can only be fully understood within such a global 
framework. In one traditional view, our brains are proposed to possess independent 
modules, as in a digital computer. For this view, we see by processing perceptual qualities 
such as visual form, color, and motion using different modules. This view's supporters 
sometimes turn to the well-known fact that the brain is organized in parallel processing 
streams. Figure I schematizes how at least three such processing streams within the visual 
cortex are activated by light impinging on the retina. One such stream goes from the retina 
through a processing stage called LGN parvo (classified due to its "parvocellular" cell type) 
to the cortical processing stages VI blob, then V2 thin stripe, then V 4, and then 
inferotemporal cortex. Another such stream goes from retina through LGN parvo, then 
through VI interblob, V2 interstripe, then V 4, and again on to inferotemporal cortex. A 
third stream goes from retina through LGN magno (classified due to its "magnocellular" 
cell type) to cortical processing layer4B in area VI, then to VI thick stripes, then MT, and 
then parietal cortex. More will be said about the role that these streams play in vision, and 
more specifically in filling-in, in a moment. 
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram of anatomical connections and neuronal selectivities of early 
visual areas in the macaque monkey brain. LGN = lateral geniculate nucleus (parvocellular 
[parvo] and magnocellular [magno] divisions. Divisions of cortical visual area VI: blob= 
cytochrome oxidase blob regions, interblob = cytochrome oxidase-poor regions 
surrounding the blobs, 4B = layer 4B. Divisions of conical visual area V2: thin = thin 
(narrow) cytochrome oxidase stripes, interstripe = cytochrome oxidase-poor regions 
between the thin and thick stripes, thick= thick (wide) cytochrome oxidase stripes. V3 = 
cortical visual area 3. V4 =conical visual area(s) 4. MT = cortical Middle Temporal area. 
Areas V2, V3, V 4, and MT have connections to other areas not explicitly represented here. 
Area V3 may also receive projections from V2 interstripes or thin stripes. Heavy lines 
indicate robust primary connections, and thin lines indicate weaker, more variable 
connections. Dotted lines represent observed connections that require additional 
verification. Icons indicate the response selectivities of cells at each processing stage: 
rainbow = wavelength selectivity, angle symbol = orientation selectivity, spectacles = 
binocular selectivity, and right-pointing arrow = selectivity to motion in a prescribed 
direction. [Adapted with permission from E.A. DeYoe and D.C. van Essen. (1988). 
Concurrent processing streams in monkey visual cortex. Trends in Neurosciences, 11, 
219-226).] 
The existence of such streams certainly supports the idea that brain processing IS 
specialized, but it does not, in itself, imply that these streams are independent modules that 
are able to fully compute their particular processes on their own. In fact, much perceptual 
data argue against the existence of independent modules, because strong interactions are 
known to occur between perceptual qualities. For example, changes in the perceived form 
or color of an object can cause changes in its perceived motion, and vice versa, while 
changes in the perceived brightness of an object can cause changes in its perceived depth, 
and vice versa (Egusa, 1983; Faubert and von Grunau, 1995; Kanizsa, 1974; Pessoa, Beck 
and Mingolla, 1996; Smallman and McKee, 1995). The existence of such interactions 
suggests that the mechanisms whereby we perceive the geometry of the world do not obey 
the classical geometrical axioms on which a lot of mathematics is based. How and why do 
these qualities interact? What is the geometry by which we really see the world? An answer 
to these questions is needed to determine the functional and computational units that govern 
behavior as we know it. 
A great deal of theoretical and experimental evidence suggests that the brain's 
processing streams compute complementary properties. Each stream's properties are 
related to those of a complementary stream much as a lock fits its key, or two pieces of a 
puzzle fit together. We are all familiar with complementarity principles in physics, such as 
the famous Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle of quantum mechanics which notes that 
precise measurement a particle's position forces uncertainty in measuring its momentum, 
and vice versa. As in physics, the mechanisms that enable each stream in the brain to 
compute one set of properties prevent it from computing a complementary set of properties. 
Due to the complementarity of the brain's processing streams, each stream exhibits 
complementary strengths and weaknesses. How, then, do these complementary properties 
get synthesized into a consistent behavioral experience? It is proposed that interactions 
between these processing streams overcome their complementary deficiencies and generate 
behavioral properties that realize the unity of conscious experiences. In this sense, pairs of 
complementary streams are the functional units because only through their interactions can 
key behavioral properties be competently computed. Said in another way, one needs to 
study how pairs of complementary streams interact together in order to understand how the 
brain computes unambiguous information about various aspects of the world. These 
interactions may be used to explain many of the ways in which perceptual qualities are 
known to influence each other. Thus, although analogies like a key fitting its lock, or 
puzzle pieces fitting together, are suggestive, they do not fully capture the dynamism of 
what complementarity means in the brain. 
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It is also well-known that each stream can possess multiple processing stages. For 
example, in Figure I, there are distinct processing stages in the lateral geniculate nucleus 
(LGN) followed by the cortical areas VI, then V2, and then V4 on their way to the 
inferotemporal and parietal cortices. Why is this so? Accumulating evidence suggests that 
these stages realize a process of hierarchical resolution of uncertainty. 'Uncertainty' here 
means that computing one set of properties at a given stage can suppress information about 
a different set of properties at that stage. Uncertainty principles are also familiar in physics, 
such as the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. In the brain, these uncertainties are proposed 
to be overcome by using more than one processing stage to form a stream. Overcoming 
informational uncertainty utilizes both hierarchical interactions within the stream and the 
parallel interactions between streams that overcome their complementary deficiencies. The 
computational unit is thus not a single processing stage; it is, rather, an ensemble of 
processing stages that interact within and between complementary processing streams. 
According to this view, the organization of the brain obeys principles of uncertainty 
and complementarity, as does the physical world with which brains interact, and of which 
they form a part. These principles reflect each brain's role as a self-organizing measuring 
device in the world, and of the world, and may better explain the brain's functional 
organization than the simpler view of computationally independent modules. How filling-in 
is controlled in the brain provides an excellent example of such complementary computing. 
All Boundaries Are Invisible 
To begin, let us recall that visual processing utilizes parallel processing streams (Figure 1). 
What evidence is there to suggest that these streams compute complementary properties, 
and how is this done? A neural theory, called FACADE (Form-And-Color-And-DEpth) 
theory (e.g., Grossberg, 1994, 1997), proposes that perceptual boundaries are formed in 
the LGN-Interblob-Interstripe-V4 stream, while perceptual SUI:/(Ices are formed in the 
LGN-Blob-Thin Stripe-V4 stream. Many experiments have supported this prediction (e.g., 
Elder and Zucker, 1998; Lamme, Rodriguez-Rodriguez and Spekreijse, 1999; Rogers-
Ramachandran and Ramachandran, 1998). 
FACADE theory suggests how and why perceptual boundaries and perceptual 
surfaces compute complementary properties. Filling-in is proposed to occur within the 
surface processing stream. Due to the proposed complementarity of the boundary and 
surface streams, one needs to analyze both streams to fully understand the way in which 
either stream normally functions. One also needs to analyze how the streams interact to 
understand properties of the filling-in process per se. Figures 2a and 2b illustrates three 
pairs of complementary properties using visual illusions that are induced by variants of a 
Kanizsa square. For example, in response to viewing Figure 2a, our brains construct a 
percept of a square even though the image contains only four black pac-man, or pie-
shaped, figures on a white background. As noted below, this percept is due to an 
interaction between the processing streams that form perceptual boundaries and surfaces. 
You might immediately wonder why our brains construct a square where there is 
none in the image. There are several functional reasons for this. One is that there is a blind 
spot in our retinas; namely, a region where no light-sensitive photoreceptors exist. This 
region is blind because of the way in which the pathways from retinal photoreceptors are 
collected together to form the optic nerve that carries them from the retina to the LGN in 
Figure 1. We arc not usually aware of this blind spot because our brains complete 
boundary and surface information across it. The actively completed parts of these percepts 
are visual illusions, because they are not derived directly from visual signals on our retinas. 
Thus many of the percepts that we believe to be "real" are visual illusions whose boundary 
and surface representations just happen to look real. I suggest that what we call a visual 
illusion is just an unfamiliar combination of boundary and surface information. This 
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Figure 2. Visual boundary and surface interactions: (a) The emergent Kanizsa square can 
be seen and recognized because of the enhanced illusory brightness within the illusory 
square relative to the background brightness outside the square. (b) The reverse-contrast 
Kanizsa square can be recognized but not seen: We are aware of the square boundary even 
though the gray color inside and outside the square is approximately the same. (c) The 
boundary of the gray disk can form around its entire circumference, even though the 
relative contrast between the disk and the white and black background squares reverses 
periodically along the circumference. (d) The vertical illusory contour that forms at the ends 
of the horizontal lines can be consciously recognized even though it cannot be seen by 
virtue of any contrast difference between it and the background. (c) In this example of neon 
color spreading, the color in the gray contours spreads in all directions until it fills the 
square illusory contour. This percept illustrates the three complementary properties of 
boundary completion and surface filling-in that are summarized below the figure: The lines 
in the square boundary are completed using a mixed cooperative-competitive process 
whereby boundaries can form inwardly and in an oriented manner between pairs or 
greater numbers of image inducers. The output of this boundary system is also insensitive 
4 
to contrast polarity because it pools signals from opposite contrasts at each position, as 
illustrated by Figures (2b) and (2c). The gray surface color fills-in the square outwardly 
and in an unoriented fashion by a diffusive mechanism. It is sensitive to contrast polarity 
because it creates visible percepts of brightness and color. Boundaries are predicted to form 
within the interblob stream, whereas surfaces are predicted to form within the blob stream; 
see Figure I. 
In response to the images in Figures 2a and 2b, illusory contours form inwardly between 
cooperating pairs of colinear edges of the four pac man, or pie shaped, inducers in the 
image. Four such contours form the boundary of the perceived Kanizsa square. (If 
boundaries formed outwardly from a single inducer, then any speck of dirt in an image 
could crowd all our percepts with an outwardly growing web of boundaries.) This 
boundary completion process is oriented to form only between like-oriented and (almost) 
colinear inducers. Both of these properties are useful to complete edges in a scene which 
are not fully detected at the retina due to the blind spot. The square boundary in Figure 2a 
can be both seen and recognized because of the enhanced illusory brightness of the Kanizsa 
square relative to its background; see below for an explanation. In contrast, the square 
boundary in Figure 2b can be recognized even though it is not visible; that is, there is no 
brightness or color difference on either side of the boundary. Figure 2b shows that some 
boundaries can be recognized even though they are perceptually unseen, or invisible. 
FACADE theory predicts that all boundaries are invisible within the boundary stream, 
which is proposed to be the interblob cortical processing stream (Figure I). 
Why are all boundaries invisible? The invisible boundary in Figure 2b can be traced 
to the fact that its vertical boundaries form between black and white inducers that possess 
opposite contrast polarity with respect to the gray background; that is, the black inducers 
have a black-to-gray, or dark-to-light, polarity with respect to the background, whereas the 
white inducers have a white-to-gray, or light-to-dark, polarity with respect to the 
background. The same is true of the boundary around the gray circular disk in Figure 2c. 
In this figure, the gray disk lies in front of a black and white textured background whose 
contrasts with respect to the disk reverse across space. In order to build a boundary around 
the entire disk, despite these contrast reversals, the boundary system pools, or adds, 
signals from pairs of simple cells that are sensitive to the same orientation and position, but 
to opposite contrast polarities. This pooling process occurs in the VI interblob stream at the 
complex cells. This is how the square boundary in response to Figure 2b, and the circular 
boundary in response to Figure 2c, start to form in our brains. This pooling process 
renders the boundary system output insensitive to contrast polarity. The boundary system 
hereby loses its ability to represent visible colors or brightnesses, since its output cannot 
signal the difference between dark and light. It is in this sense that "all boundaries are 
invisible". The inward and oriented boundary completion process that forms the illusory 
square is activated by these pooled signals in the V2 interstripe area (Von der Heydt, 
Peterhans, and Baumgartner, 1984; Peterhans and Von der Heydt, 1989). These three 
properties of boundary completion are summarized at the bottom of Figure 2. Figure 2d 
illustrates another invisible boundary that can be consciously recognized. 
Such a boundary formation process in the brain is a key mechanism whereby we 
perceive geometrical objects such as lines, curves, and textured objects. Rather than being 
defined in terms of such classical units as points and lines, these boundaries arise as a 
coherent pattern of excitatory and inhibitory signals across a mixed cooperative-
competitive feedback network that is defined by a nonlinear dynamical system which 
describes the cellular interactions from the retina through LGN and the VI interblob and V2 
interstripe areas (Gove, Grossberg, and Mingolla, 1995; Grossberg, 1999b; Grossberg 
and Raizada, 2000; Grossberg and Williamson, 2000). In such a network, spatially long-
range excitatory, or cooperative, interactions try to build the boundaries across space, while 
interacting with shorter-range inhibitory, or competitive, interactions that suppress incorrect 
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boundary groupings. These interactions select the best boundary grouping from among 
many possible interpretations of a scene. The winning grouping is represented either by an 
equilibrium point or a synchronous oscillation of the system, depending upon how system 
parameters are chosen. Classical geometry is hereby replaced by nonlinear neural networks 
that do a type of on-line statistical inference to select and complete the statistically most 
favored boundary groupings of a scene, while suppressing noise and incorrect groupings. 
The emerging patterns of boundary excitation obey the three boundary completion 
properties (inward, oriented, insensitive) that are summarized above. Our model for how 
such perceptual boundaries are formed has been called the Boundary Contour System, or 
BCS. 
Sm·faces Are For Seeing 
If boundaries are invisible, then how do we see anything? FACADE theory predicts that 
visible properties of a scene are represented by a surface processing stream, which is 
predicted to occur within the Blob cortical stream (Figure 1). A key step in representing a 
visible surface is the filling-in process. What is filling-in and why and how does it occur? 
An early stage of surface processing compensates for variable illumination, or discounts 
the illuminant. Otherwise, illuminant variations, which can change from moment to 
moment, could seriously distort all percepts. Discounting the illuminant attenuates color 
and brightness signals except near regions of sufficiently rapid surface change, such as 
edges or texture gradients, which are relatively uncontaminated by illuminant variations. 
Neural models have proposed how later stages of surface formation fill in the attenuated 
regions with these relatively uncontaminated color and brightness signals (Cohen and 
Grossberg, 1984; Gave, Grossberg, and Mingolla, 1995; Grossberg and Todorovic', 
1988; Grossberg and Kelly, 1999; Pessoa, Mingolla, and Neumann, 1995). Remarkably, 
the same process can also allocate brightness and color signals to their perceived depths on 
a 3-D surface, through a process called su1j'ace capture, whereby the boundaries formed 
within the V2 interstripes interact with the V2 thin stripes and area V4 (see Figure I) to 
trigger depth-selective filling-in processes there (Grossberg, 1994, 1997; Grossberg and 
McLoughlin, 1997; Grossberg and Pessoa, 1998; Kelly and Grossberg, 2000). This multi-
stage filling-in process is an example of hierarchical resolution of uncertainty, because the 
later filling-in stage overcomes uncertainties about brightness and color that were caused by 
discounting the illuminant at an earlier processing stage. How surface capture may occur in 
the brain is summarized below. 
Before discussing depthful surface capture, we first need to understand a more 
basic property: How do the illuminant-discounted signals fill-in an entire region? Filling-in 
behaves like a diffusion of brightness across space. For an example, consider the percept 
of neon color spreading that is elicited by Figure 2e (Redies and Spillmann, 1981 ). This 
figure consists of circular annuli, part of which are black and part gray. In response to this 
figure, we can see an illusory square filled with a gray color. FACADE theory suggests 
that this percept is due to an interaction between the boundary and surface systems. In 
particular, the black boundaries cause small breaks in the gray boundaries where they join; 
see Grossberg and Mingolla (1985) and Grossberg (1994, 1999a) for further discussion of 
how this happens. The gray color can hereby spread through these breaks from the annuli 
into the illusory square. In this percept, filling-in spreads outwardly from the individual 
gray inducers in all directions. Its spread is thus unoriented. How is this spread of 
activation contained? FACADE theory predicts that signals from the boundary stream to the 
surface stream define the regions within which filling-in is restricted. These boundaries 
surround the annuli (except for their small breaks) and also form the square illusory 
contour. Thus, filling-in is a form of anisotropic diffusion in which boundary signals 
nonlinearly gate, or inhibit, the diffusive flow of signal. Without these boundary signals, 
filling-in would dissipate across space, and no surface percept could form. Invisible 
boundaries hereby indirectly assure their own visibility through their interactions with the 
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surface stream, within which all visible percepts are predicted to form. 
With these comments in mind, we can better understand finer aspects of the other 
percepts that form in response to the images in Figure 2. In Figure 2a, the square boundary 
is induced by four black pac-men that are all less luminant than the white background. In 
the surface stream, discounting the illuminant causes these pac-men to induce local 
brightness enhancements adjacent to the pac-men, just within the boundary of the square. 
At a subsequent processing stage, these enhanced brightness signals diffuse within the 
square boundary, thereby causing the entire interior of the square to look brighter. The 
filled-in square is visible because the filled-in activity level within the square is higher than 
the filled-in activity of the surrounding region. Filling-in can hereby lead to visible percepts 
because it is sensitive to contrast polarity. These three propetties of surface filling-in 
(outward, unoriented, sensitive) are summarized at the bottom of Figure 2. They are easily 
seen to be complementary to the corresponding properties of boundary completion. 
In Figure 2b, the opposite polarities of the two pairs of pac men with respect to the 
gray background lead to approximately equal filled-in activities inside and outside the 
square, so the boundary can be recognized but not seen. In Figure 2d, the white 
background can fill-in uniformly on both sides of the vertical boundary, by diffusing 
around the horizontal black lines, so no visible contrast difference is seen. 
In addition to explaining percepts such as those arising from Figure 2, filling-in 
also clarifies how our brains can fill-in perceived brightnesses and colors within the 
boundaries that span retinal imperfections like the blind spot. Thus the same mechanisms 
can complete surface representations across those spatial gaps in retinal signaling that are 
caused at the retina itself by the blind spot, as well as across spatial gaps in retinal signaling 
that are caused by higher levels which actively suppress spurious retinal signals. Similar 
considerations help to explain such basic percepts as the color blue (Grossberg, 1987a, 
Section 31, which is caused by a spatially very sparse distribution of blue cones on the 
retina (Boynton, Eskew, and Olson, 1985; Tansley and Boynton, 1976, 1978). 
These remarks just begin to illustrate the importance of filling-in, and how it seems 
to be organized in the brain. Even in the seemingly simple case of the Kanizsa square, one 
often perceives a square hovering in front of four partially occluded circular disks, which 
seem to be completed behind the square, even though they are invisible there. FACADE 
theory predicts how surface filling-in is organized to help such figure-ground percepts to 
occur, in response to both two-dimensional pictures and three-dimensional scenes; see 
Grossberg ( 1994, 1997), Grossberg and McLoughlin (1997), and Kelly and Grossberg 
(2000) for examples. 
In summary, boundary and surface formation illustrate two key principles of brain 
organization: hierarchical resolution of uncertainty, and complementary interstream 
interactions. Figure 2 summarizes three pairs of complementary properties of the boundary 
and surface streams. Hierarchical resolution of uncertainty is illustrated by surface filling-
in: Discounting the illuminant creates uncertainty by suppressing surface color and 
brightness signals except near surface discontinuities. Higher stages of filling-in complete 
the surface representation using properties that are complementary to those whereby 
boundaries are formed, guided by signals from these boundaries. Our model for how 
surfaces are formed is called the Feature Contour System, or FCS, because it clarifies how 
the "features" which we consciously see get processed into visible three-dimensional 
surface percepts. This happens through filling-in operations that are activated by the 
"feature contours" which are extracted when the illuminant is discounted. FACADE theory 
attempts to characterize how the BCS and FCS are internally organized and how they 
interact together to overcome their complementary deficiencies. 
Boundary-gated surface filling-in provides a radically different view of how a 
surface is formed than the classical geometrical view whereby surfaces are defined in terms 
of surface normals or differential forms. The mathematical analysis of this type of 
anisotropic diffusion has hardly begun, even though its remarkable properties are already 
been successfully used in processing complex imagery in technology (Waxman et a!, 
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1995). Another important problem on which a great deal of work remains to be done 
concerns the origin of the complementarity of boundaries and surfaces. I predict that this 
property arises through a process of global symmetry-breaking as the embryonic brain 
bifurcates into its parallel cortical processing streams. 
From Brightness Constancy, Contrast, and Assimilation to Figure-Ground 
Separation, Texture Perception, and the McCollough Effect 
There has been a great deal of discussion and controversy about whether or not a physical 
filling-in interaction exists; e.g., Dennett (199 I) and Pessoa, Thompson, and Noe (1998). 
Such a question can only be answered empirically, by which I mean by direct experimental 
testing and by showing how neural models that include filling-in can explain many data that 
models which do not contain it. In this regard, it is important to note that, in the Dennett 
critique of the physical existence of filling-in, no explanations of the parametric properties 
of the percepts that have been used to support the filling-in concept were attempted. This is 
true despite the fact that various modeling articles had already explained and simulated quite 
a few perceptual data by making critical use of a neural filling-in process; e.g., Cohen and 
Grossberg (1984), Grossberg and Mingolla (1985), Grossberg (1987a, 1987b ), 
Grossberg and Todorovic' (1988). Viewpoints or models with a manifestly inferior 
explanatory and predictive range are simply not competitive. Data which directly support a 
filling-in process by trying to characterize its temporal dynamics have also been reported 
(Paradiso and Nakayama, 1991) and have been quantitatively simulated by Arrington 
(1994) using the brightness perception model of Grossberg and Todorovic' (1988). 
Since that time, many other data have been explained and simulated by FACADE 
theory with the help of filling-in. These include data about 3-D figure-ground perception 
(Grossberg, I 994, 1997; Grossberg and McLoughlin, !997; Kelly and Grossberg, 2000), 
texture perception (Grossberg and Pessoa, 1998), brightness perception (Gove, 
Grossberg, and Mingolla, 1995; Grossberg and Kelly, 1999), and aftereffects (Francis and 
Grossberg, 1996), including the long-term McCollough effect (Grossberg, Hwang, and 
Mingolla, 2000; McCollough, 1965). Most of these data have no other mechanistic 
explanation. Any vision theory that purports to do without filling-in now needs to explain 
these data in order to be competitive. In particular, any such theory needs to provide 
principled explanations of how basic phenomena like discounting the illuminant and filling-
in across the blind spot can occur. 
One of the lessons from these modeling studies is that filling-in cannot adequately 
be studied outside the context of a more comprehensive vision model, if only because of 
the complementarity of boundary and surface computations. Another lesson is that different 
combinations of mechanisms may be rate-limiting in giving rise to the different percepts 
which depend in part on filling-in. For example, Grossberg and Todorovic' ( 1988) showed 
that the following simple mechanisms are sufficient to explain quite a few data about 
brightness perception, but not all such data: 
(I) an on-center off-surround network of cells that obey shunting, or membrane, 
equations. Such a network can discount the illuminant, compute Weber-law modulated 
estimates of image reflectances that are sensitive to the local context of luminance 
signals, and normalize image intensities; 
(2) a boundary detection and completion network; 
(3) a network for filling-in the discounted pattern computed by (l) within the boundaries 






















Figure 3. How filling-in can explain examples of brightness constancy (Figures 3a and 
3b), brightness contrast (Figure 3c), and brightness assimilation (Figure 3d) using 
mechanisms that discount the illuminant (FEATURE) from a pattern of image luminances 
(STIMULUS) and use the discounted activity pattern to compute a BOUNDARY 
representation within which the FEATURE pattern fills-in to generate an OUTPUT 
brightness pattern. See text for details. [Adapted with permission from Grossberg and 
Todorovic' (1988).] 
Figure 3 gives four examples of how such a network can work. The lowest row of each 
panel in Figure 3 shows a one-dimensional cross-section of image luminance. The next-
lowest row shows how a shunting on-center off-surround network of cells can transform 
these image intensities. Comparing (a) and (b) shows that such a network can compensate 
for a gradient of illumination; see the patterns labeled FEATURE in the figure. On the other 
hand, in so doing, it can also distort the true pattern of image reflectances by generating 
cusps and dips in the profile of cell activities across space. One of these distortions is the 
attenuation of image reflectances away from object boundaries or other rapidly changing 
luminance gradients across space. This is the key mechanism whereby the illuminant is 
discounted. Boundary and surface interactions help to compensate for these distortions by 
exploiting the information that survives the discounting process. The boundaries create a 
frame within which the illuminant-discounted signals can fill-in within the surface 
processing stream; see the patterns labeled BOUNDARY in the figure. Thus, in Figures 3a 
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and 3b, boundaries form at the luminance discontinuities of the image because the 
boundary system is sensitive to discontinuities in the activity profile of discounted signals. 
The pattern of these discounted signals is topographically mapped into Filling-In Domains, 
or FIDOs, within the surface stream, or FCS. Here the discounted signals can begin to 
spread across space. This spreading process has many of the properties of diffusion. The 
signal spread is contained within boundary signals that are topographically mapped from 
the BCS into the FIDOs. The result is given in the top row of each panel; namely, the 
patterns labeled 0 UTPUT. 
Figures 3a and 3b show how these simple mechanisms can discount the illuminant 
and recover the original pattern of image reflectances under some circumstances. However, 
due to the discounting process, image reflectances are not always veridically recovered. For 
example, the STIMULUS in Figure 3c contains two steps of equal luminance on a 
background that varies so gradually between them that no boundary is detected. In the 
OUTPUT profile, brightness contrast obtains; namely, the right step is more active than the 
left step in the OUTPUT activity profile. This is due to the sensitivity of the on-center off-
surround network to image contrasts; see the FEATURE pattern. Remarkably, however, 
the luminance gradient that caused the brightness contrast is not visible in the final percept. 
The background has uniform brightness in the OUTPUT because no boundary exists 
whereby to restrict the filling-in process between the two luminance steps, as can also 
occurs in vivo under such conditions. In addition to showing how brightness contrast can 
occur due to the discounting process, this is also a philosophically interesting example 
because it demonstrates a "visible effect of an invisible cause". 
Figure 3d shows that the same mechanisms can also cause the opposite of 
brightness contrast; namely, brightness assimilation (Helson, !963). This figure simulates 
an effect that was reported by Shapley and Reid (1986). The luminance profile here is 
derived from a standard brightness contrast profile by the introduction of two additional test 
regions. These test luminance steps are the same and are placed on equally but less 
luminant backgrounds. A simple brightness contrast explanation would suggest that the 
two steps should have the same brightness. However, humans report that the left step 
looks brighter than the right one, as also occurs in the OUTPUT activity profile of the 
model. In some way, the perceived brightness of the background has been "assimilated" 
into the brightness of the steps. How this happens in the model can be directly inferred 
from Figure 3d, which shows that a complicated pattern of activity cusps and dips is 
caused by the discounting process. These cusps and dips are broader than the boundaries 
that they induce. When this FEATURE profile fills-in within its narrower boundaries, the 
reported assimilative effect obtains in the OUTPUT as an emergent property of network 
interactions. 
The same model can explain many other brightness data in a unified way, including 
variants of the Craik-O'hrien-Cornsweet effect, the Koffka-Benussi ring, Kanizsa-
Minguzzi anomalous brightness differentiation, the Hermann grid, a Land Modrian viewed 
under constant and gradient illumination that cannot be explained by Retinex theory, 
impossible staircases, hull's eyes, and various nested combinations of luminance profiles. 
That such a simple combination of discounting, boundary, and surface interactions can 
explain such a large body of brightness data, with a fixed set of parameters, is a challenge 
to all other models of filling-in and brightness perception. 
3-D Figure-Ground Separation 
Although the mechanisms that are illustrated in Figure 3 may be necessary for explaining 
how filling-in works within the brain, they are certainly not sufficient. In particular, the 
mechanisms in Figure 3 are not sufficient to explain how two eyes work together to 
generate three-dimensional percepts of surfaces in depth, notably how percepts of 
occluding and occluded objects are generated in depth. The struggle to understand the large 
and challenging data bases about such figure-ground phenomena has been a key motivation 
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Figure 4. FACADE macrocircuit showing interactions of the Boundary Contour System 
(BCS) and Feature Contour System (FCS). See text for details. [Reprinted with permission 
from Kelly and Grossberg (2000).] 
Figure 4 is a macrocircuit of FACADE theory in its present form. Because the interactions 
posited by the theory have explained and simulated so many data about 3-D vision, its main 
operations will be summarized here to clarify some of the perceptual issues that are handled 
by the theory, and to illustrate how surface filling-in processes may be intimately 
intertwined with boundary processes. Monocular processing of left-eye and right-eye 
inputs by the retina and lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) discounts the illuminant and 
generates parallel signals to the BCS and FCS. These signals go to model cortical simple 
cells via pathways I in Figure 4, and to monocular filling-in domains (FIDOs) via 
pathways 2. Model simple cells have oriented receptive fields and come in multiple sizes. 
Simple cell outputs are binocularly combined at complex and complex end-stopped (or 
hypercomplex) cells via pathways 3. Complex cells with larger receptive fields can 
binocularly fuse a broader range of disparities than can cells with smaller receptive fields 
(see Smallman and MacLeod (1994) for a review). Competition across disparity at each 
position and among cells of a given size scale sharpens complex cell disparity tuning (Fahle 
and Westheimer, 1995). Spatial competition (end-stopping) and orientational competition 
convert complex cell responses into spatially and orientationally sharper responses at 
hypercomplex cells. 
How are these responses from multiple receptive field sizes combined to generate 
positionally accurate representations of relative depths from the observer? FACADE theory 
proposes that hypercomplex cells activate bipole cells via pathway 4. These bipole cells 
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carry out long-range grouping and boundary completion, and are proposed to occur in the 
cortical area V2 Interstripes. The bipole grouping process collects together the outputs from 
all hypercomplex cells, of all sizes, that are sensitive to a given depth range. All of these 
outputs activate a shared set of bipole cells. The bipole cells, in turn, send excitatory 
feedback signals via pathways 5 back to all hypercomplex cells that represent the same 
position and orientation, and inhibitory feedback signals to hypercomplex cells at the same 
and nearby positions and orientations. This feedback process binds together, or groups, 
cells of multiple sizes into a BCS representation, or copy, that is sensitive to a prescribed 
range of depths. In this way, each BCS copy completes boundaries only within a given 
depth range, using all the information that is available from the multiple receptive field 
sizes. Multiple BCS copies are formed, each corresponding to different (but possibly 
overlapping) depth ranges. 
This grouping process is also proposed to play a key role in figure-ground 
separation. The main fact for present purposes is that each bipole cell has an oriented 
receptive field with two parts (Figure 5). Each part receives inputs from a range of almost 
colinear orientations and positions. When the bipole cell does not receive direct bottom-up 
activation of its cell body, it can only fire if both parts of its receptive field are 
simultaneously active. This assures that the cells do not complete boundaries beyond a line 
end unless there is another line end which provides evidence for such a linkage. The bipole 
cell thus behaves like a statistical AND gate. Such cells were first used by Cohen and 
Grossberg (1984) and Grossberg and Mingolla (1985) to model data about perceptual 
grouping and filling-in. Cells with similar properties in cortical area V2 were first reported 
by von der Heydt, Peterhans and Baumgartner ( 1984 ). Their properties are consistent with 
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Figure 5. T-junction sensitivity in the BCS: (a) T-junction in an image. (b) Bipole cells 
provide long-range cooperation ( + ), whereas hypercomplex cells provide shorter-ranger 
competition(-). (c) An edn-gap in the vertical boundary arises due to this combination of 
cooperation and competition. [Reprinted with permission from Grossberg (1997).] 
How does the grouping process contribute to figure-ground separation? As noted above, 
the feedback from bipole cells to hypercomplex cells combines long-range excitatory 
feedback with shorter-range inhibitory feedback (Figure 5). Together, these feedback 
processes make the system sensitive toT-junctions in an image, without the use of explicit 
T -junction operators. This is because excitatory bipole feedback strengthens the boundary 
along the top of a T while inhibiting nearby boundary positions where the stem of the T 
joins its top. This can be understood by considering horizontally-oriented cells that are 
located where the top of the T joins its stem. Such cells receive excitatory support from 
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both branches of the top. On the other hand, vertically-oriented cells that process the stem 
of the T where it joins the top receive excitatory support only from one branch of their 
receptive field; namely, where it is activated by the stem. The inhibition of the stem by the 
top causes a gap in the boundary (see Figure 5), termed an end-gap. During filling-in, 
boundaries contain the filling-in process. Where end-gaps occur, brightness or color can 
flow out of a figural region would otherwise have been contained within the region defined 
by the T edges. FACADE theory predicts that this escape of color or brightness via the 
filling-in process is one of the key steps that initiates figure-ground separation; see 
Grossberg (1994, 1997), Grossberg and McLoughlin (1997), and Kelly and Grossberg 
(2000) for examples of how this can occur. 
How are the multiple depth-selective BCS copies used to capture brightness and 
color signals within the corresponding depth-selective FCS surface representations? There 
are at least two stages in this surface filling-in process. The first stage is called monocular 
filling-in domains, or monocular FIDOs, which are presently thought to exist within the 
Thin Stripes of cortical area V2. Monocular FJDOs receive brightness and color signals 
from a single eye. A pair of monocular FIDOs, one for each eye, corresponds to each 
binocular BCS copy. Several BCS copies, that represent nearby depth ranges, may send 
convergent signals, albeit with possibly different weights, to each monocular FIDO, 
thereby generating a continuous change in perceived depth across a finite set of FIDOs. 
The swface caJ)Iure process is controlled by interacting BCS signals and 
illuminant-discounted FCS signals. Pathways 2 in Figure 4 input their discounted 
monocular FCS signals to all of the monocular FJDOs. The surface capture process then 
determines which of these FIDOs will succeed in selectively filling-in these signals, and 
thereby lifting the monocular FIDO signals into depth-selective surface representations for 
purposes of filling-in. The boundary signals along pathways 6 in Figure 4 determine which 
FIDOs will fill-in. These boundary signals selectively capture those FCS inputs that arc 
spatially coincident and orientationally aligned with the BCS boundaries. Other FCS inputs 
are suppressed by this BCS-FCS interaction. These properties naturally arise when double-
opponent cells process boundary-gated signals in the monocular FIDOs. How this 
happens, and how this interaction can explain data about binocular fusion and rivalry, 
among other percepts, are discussed in Grossberg ( 1987b ). 
The captured FCS inputs, and only these, can trigger diffusive filling-in of a 
surface representation within the selected FIDOs. Because these filled-in surfaces are 
activated by depth-selective BCS boundaries, they inherit the same depths as these 
boundaries. This property helps to explain how 3-D surface representations may represent 
both the depths and the qualia, such as color and brightness, that occur in our percepts of 
3-D objects. This intimate linkage between depth and brightness helps to explain, for 
example, data about proximity-luminance covariation, or why brighter surfaces tend to look 
closer; e.g., Egusa (1983). 
Not every such filling-in event can generate a surface representation. Because 
activity spreads until it hits a boundary, only surfaces that are surrounded by a connected 
BCS boundary, or fine web of such boundaries, are effectively filled-in. The diffusion of 
activity dissipates across the FIDO otherwise. This property helps to explain many data, 
ranging from data about neon color spreading to data about 3-D figure-ground perception; 
see, for example, Grossberg ( 1994) for further discussion. 
An analysis of how the BCS and FCS react to 3-D images shows that too many 
boundary and surface fragments are formed as a result of the size-disparity correlation 
(Julesz and Schumer, 1981; Kulikowski, 1978; Richards and Kaye, 1974; Schor et a!, 
1984; Tyler, 1975). In particular, large scales can fuse a larger range of disparities than can 
small scales. How are the surface depths that we actually perceive selected from this range 
of possibilities across all scales? The proposed answer to this question clarifies how a 
unified percept of boundary and surface is achieved, despite the fact, as noted above, that 
the boundary and surface systems compute complementary properties. The key issue is 
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thus: How is perceptual consistency derived from boundary-surface complementarity? 
FACADE theory predicts how this may be achieved by feedback between the boundary and 
surface streams, that is predicted to occur no later than cortical area V2. This mutual 
feedback helps to clarify many confusing properties of visual perception and visual 
neuroscience, ranging from figure-ground properties (see below) to why the blob and 
interblob streams seem to share so many receptive field properties even though they carry 
out such different tasks. In particular, this feedback interaction clarifies how boundary 
cells, which tend to summate inputs from both contrast polarities, can also be modulated by 
surface cells, which are sensitive to just one contrast polarity. 
Boundary-surface consistency is achieved in FACADE theory by a contrast-
sensitive process that detects the contours of successfully filled-in regions within the 
monocular FIDOs. Only successfully-filled in regions can activate such a contour-sensitive 
process, because other regions either do not fill-in at all, or their filling-in dissipates across 
space. The filled--in contours activate FCS-to-BCS feedback signals (pathways 7 in Figure 
4). These feedback signals further excite the BCS boundaries corresponding to their own 
positions and depths. The boundaries that activated the successfully filled-in surfaces in the 
first place are hereby strengthened. The feedback signals also inhibit redundant boundaries 
at their own positions and farther depths. This inhibition from near-to-far is called 
boundary pruning. It illustrates a perceptual principle that I call the asymmetry between 
near and far. This principle shows itself in many perceptual data, including data about 3-D 
neon color spreading (Nakayama, Shimojo, and Ramachandran, 1990); see Grossberg 
( 1994, 1999a) for a discussion of how to explain such data. 
How does boundary pruning contribute to figure-ground separation? Boundary 
pruning spares the closest surface representation that successfully fills-in a given set of 
positions. Boundary pruning also inhibits redundant copies of the boundaries of occluding 
objects that would otherwise form at farther depths. When the competition from these 
redundant occluding boundaries is removed, the boundaries of partially occluded objects 
can be completed bebind them on BCS copies that represent these farther depths. 
Moreover, when the redundant occluding boundaries collapse, the redundant surfaces that 
they momentarily supported at the monocular FIDOs collapse. Occluding surfaces are 
hereby seen to lie in front of occluded surfaces. The boundary pruning process helps to 
explain many paradoxical data about interactions between depth and brightness, such as: 
Why do brighter Kanizsa squares look closer (Bradley and Dumais, 1984; Kanizsa, 1955, 
1974; Purgh6 and Coren, 1992)? Why is boundary pruning relevant to this phenomenon? 
The brightness of a Kanizsa square is an emergent property; it can only be determined after 
all the brightness and darkness inducers fill in within the Kanizsa square. Somehow this 
emergent brightness within the FIDOs then influences the perceived depth of the square. 
Within FACADE theory, this means that the brightness within the FIDO needs to influence 
the depth-selective BCS copies that control relative depth. FACADE theory shows how this 
can naturally occur via the BCS-to-FCS feedback signals that ensure boundary-surface 
consistency (Grossberg, 1997, Section 22). 
Visible brightness percepts are not, however, represented within the monocular 
FIDOs. Indeed, all model representations in V2, both of binocular boundaries and 
monocular filled-in surfaces, are predicted to be amodal, or perceptually invisible. These 
representations are predicted to be used directly by object recognition mechanisms in 
infcrotemporal cortex and beyond, since they accurately represent occluding and occluded 
objects. In particular, the boundary pruning process enables the boundaries of occluded 
objects to be completed within the BCS, which makes them much easier to recognize. The 
surface representations within the monocular FIDOs cannot, therefore, distinguish between 
which parts of a surface are occluded, and which are not. These surface representations fill-
in an occluded object within the completed object boundaries, even behind an opaque 
occluding object. Thus, if only this representation of the world existed, then every 
occluding object would appear transparent. 
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This fact raises the following basic question: How does the visual cortex generate 
representations of occluding and occluded objects that can be easily recognized, yet also 
generate representations of occluding and occluded objects that allow us to consciously see, 
and reach for, only the unoccluded parts of objects? FACADE theory proposes that the 
latter goal is realized at the binocular FIDOs using a different combination of boundary and 
surface representations of occluded objects than is found at the monocular FIDOs. How is 
happens will now be summarized. 
The surface representations that are generated at the monocular FIDOs are depth-
selective, but they do not combine brightness and color signals from both eyes. Binocular 
combination of brightness and color signals takes place at the binocular FIDOs, which are 
predicted to exist in cortical area V 4. It is here that modal, or visible, surface 
representations are predicted to occur, and to represent only the visible parts of occluded 
objects, except in cases where transparent percepts are selectively generated by configura! 
scenic properties. 
Thus it is in the binocular FIDOs that monocular FCS signals from both eyes 
(pathways 8 in Figure 4) are predicted to be binocularly matched. An analysis of the 
surviving matched signals shows that they are redundantly represented on multiple FIDOs 
at the same positions. Which signals are redundant can only be tested by assessing which 
monocular FIDOs can successfully fill-in. Then the corresponding binocular FIDO can be 
allowed to fill in, and all farther FIDOs at those positions can be inhibited. These redundant 
binocularly matched signals are pruned by inhibitory contrast-sensitive signals from the 
monocular FIDOs (pathways 9 in Figure 4 ). The pruning signals from the monocular 
FIDOs to the binocular FIDOs inhibit the FCS signals at their own positions and farther 
depths. As a result, occluding objects cannot redundantly fill-in surface representations at 
multiple depths. This is another example of the asymmetry between near and far. It is called 
su1face pruning. Contrast-sensitive output signals from successfully filled-in regions 
within the monocular FIDOs are hereby predicted to carry out two types of pruning: they 
prune redundant boundaries in cortical area V2, and redundant surface elements in cortical 
area V4. 
As in the case of the monocular FIDOs, the FCS signals to the binocular FIDOs can 
initiate filling-in only where they are spatially coincident and orientationally aligned with 
BCS boundaries. BCS-to-FCS pathways 10 in Figure 4 carry out depth-selective surface 
capture of the binocularly matched FCS signals that survive surface pruning. In all, the 
binocular FIDOs fill in FCS signals that: (a) survive within-depth binocular FCS matching 
and across-depth FCS inhibition; (b) are spatially coincident and orientationally aligned 
with the BCS boundaries; and (c) are surrounded by a connected boundary or fine web of 
such boundaries. 
One further property is needed to complete this summary: At the binocular FIDOs, 
the BCS adds the boundaries that are computed at nearer depths to those that represent 
farther depths. This instance of the asymmetry between near and far is called boundary 
enrichment. The enriched boundaries prevent occluding objects from looking transparent 
by blocking filling-in of occluded objects behind them. The total filled-in surface 
representation across all binocular FIDOs represents the visible percept. It is called a 
FACADE representation because it combines together, or multiplexes, properties of Form-
And-Color-And-Depth. It is this culminating interaction that gives FACADE theory its 
name. 
Although the FACADE macrocircuit is perhaps the most complicated vision model 
yet proposed, all of its operations have supportive psychophysical and neural data, and it 
provides a unified explanation of many perceptual data, such as the Weisstein effect, 3-D 
neon color spreading, 3-D Kanizsa-Varin percepts, Bregman-Kanizsa figure-ground 
separation, Kanizsa stratification, daVinci stereopsis (Grossberg, 1994; Grossberg and 
McLoughlin, 1997), and various monocular and binocular percepts of brightness and 
lightness, including Fechner's paradox and the Munker-White, Benary cross, and 
15 
checkerboard percepts (Grossberg, 1994, 1997; Grossberg and Kelly, 1999; Kelly and 
Grossberg, 2000). 
Perceptual Learning, Aftereffects, and the McCollough Effect 
FACADE theory also points to issues that are quite invisible without its framework as a 
guide. For example, how do binocular boundaries successfully interact with monocular 
FIDOs? It is well known that binocular fusion can positionally displace the perceived 
location of a binocularly fused boundary relative to the locations of its monocular inputs to 
the two eyes (von Tschermak-Seysenegg, 1952). How, then, do the displaced binocular 
boundaries get positionally aligned with the monocular FCS feature contour signals that 
they need to contain? Grossberg (1987b) suggested that this occurs through learning that is 
based upon interactions between the BCS and the FCS. Grossberg (1987b) outlined how 
this type of learning could qualitatively explain many properties of the McCollough effect 
(McCollough, 1965), which is an orientationally-specific long-term chromatic aftereffect. 
More recently, Grossberg, Hwang, and Mingolla (2000) have developed this suggestion 
into a rigorous computational study which shows how this type of learning may contribute 
to a quantitative simulation of thirteen different McCollough effect experiments. In addition 
to these learned alignments, one also needs to incorporate mechanisms for dynamically 
resetting cortical representations. These reset mechanisms can influence explanations of 
filling-in by showing how certain perceptual afterimages can occur (Francis and 
Grossberg, 1996). Thus, once one has a principled theory like FACADE theory as a tool, 
one can begin to explain, and to see unexpected mechanistic relationships between, data 
that would otherwise seem to be mysterious and disconnected. That is why, in the final 
analysis, we build models of how the brain sees. It is also why one cannot fully understand 
filling-in outside the context of such a comprehensive analysis. 
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